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Abstract
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1 Introduction
The beneficial effect of business R&D efforts on technological change and growth has
been widely acknowledged by scholars and policy makers (Romer, 1990; Mansfield,
1988, 1962; Aghion and Howitt, 1998; Scherer, 1965; Geroski and Toker, 1996). For
this reason, governments in industrialized countries spend considerable amounts of
money for supporting R&D activities of firms which is mainly justified by the will to
overcome presumed market failures (Nelson, 1959; Arrow, 1962; Stiglitz and Weiss,
1981) that lead to an underinvestment in R&D from a social point of view. One of the
main governmental instruments in this context are public R&D grants. Based upon
policy and academic interest towards this topic, evaluating the effects of such policy
instruments has a long tradition in empirical innovation research (see David et al.,
2000; Cerulli, 2010; Zúñiga Vicente et al., 2014 for surveys).
So far, the main focus in the literature has been on input additionality of R&D
grants, while only some studies assess their impact on output. Rarely, the interrelated
nature of these input and output stages has been accounted for by using a simulta-
neous equation model. Consequently, this paper takes a more structural approach in
order to integrate both stages into one econometric model. This is done by apply-
ing a conceptually new variant of the Crépon–Duguet–Mairesse (CDM) framework
(Crépon et al., 1998). The resulting model allows to estimate input and output addi-
tionality effects of subsidies and, in particular, whether subsidized projects generate
a discount or premium in terms of innovation outcome when compared to the non–
subsidized, i.e. purely privately financed, projects.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: the next section sketches the
framework of this paper, both conceptually and methodologically. The third section
presents the econometric model. Data and variables are discussed in section 4 and
section 5 discusses the empirical implementation and results before concluding.
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2 Background
2.1 Conceptual background
Figure 1 shows a representation of how subsidies may impact the input and output
stages of R&D. First, a firm may choose to apply for a R&D subsidy, and the pub-
lic agency decides whether or not to grant a subsidy. Furthermore the agency also
decides on the subsidy rate, i.e. the share of the total cost of the proposed project
that will be covered by the subsidy (see e.g. Takalo et al., 2013 for a structural model
on the decision process).1 When learning about the amount of public R&D becom-
ing available, the firm will decide on how much to invest in R&D privately. Policy
makers hope that subsidizing R&D has a positive effect on the amount firms invest
privately. The policy makers logic is intuitive: the firm would not have conducted the
project without the subsidy; due to the positive decision on the public R&D grant,
however, the firm then conducts the project in addition to others that it would have
implemented even in absence of subsidies. As the subsidy never covers the full cost
of the proposed R&D project, the government expects that also private R&D increases
as response to the R&D grant. As a result, both the public and the private R&D will
generate additional innovation output and thus foster technological change in the
future. In Figure 1 this is depicted as innovation output in period t + 1.
However, this positive picture on how subsidies help to spur innovation and tech-
nological progress may not apply in reality for two reasons. First, the firms might ap-
ply with projects that they would even conduct at the same scale if no subsidies were
granted. In this case, the subsidy scheme would be subject to so-called full crowding–
out effects and no additional R&D projects would be conducted in the economy. In-
stead, the granted public funds would simply replace parts of the private investment.
Second, even if the subsidized firms implement the subsidized projects in addition to
1The maximum subsidy rate is usually limited to 50% of the total project cost in the EU, but there
are exceptions for small and medium–sized firms and for firms in structurally weak regions (so–called
Objective 1 regions) where the maximum subsidy rate may exceed 50%.
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Figure 1: subsidy-extension of CDM framework
their other R&D activities as expected by the government, and so-called input addi-
tionality is thus present, the publicly invested R&D may not necessarily also lead to
output additionality, that is, more innovation. As Goolsbee (1998) argues, the granted
subsidies might be redirected to higher wages of researchers instead of hiring new
staff and/or investing this money in other research–related assets. If higher wages
do not coincide with higher marginal productivity of R&D labor, one would find
evidence for input additionality but not output additionality. Furthermore, the sub-
sidized R&D project might be riskier than the R&D projects that are funded fully
privately (see David et al., 2000), and therefore the failure rate might be high, and
thus no output additionality may be present either.
Moreover, it is questionable whether the contribution of public R&D to output ad-
ditionality at the firm-level is higher or lower than the private marginal productivity.
There are reasons for both: given the arguments above on factors that may limit the
output additionality of subsidized R&D, it could, on the one hand, be argued that
subsidized R&D has a lower marginal productivity than purely privately financed
R&D activity. On the other hand, subsidized R&D projects may also show a higher
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productivity: the subsidies analyzed in this study are selective, i.e. they are not au-
tomatically granted but the project proposals are assessed by experts. Therefore the
granted projects are winners of a peer-review projects and therefore firms might have
submitted their most promising ideas which may then result in high productivity.
In addition, subsidized R&D projects might be closely followed and monitored by
the public agency, which could imply a better management of the subsidized R&D
projects and this might have a beneficial impact on the innovative output (Barney
et al., 2001; Colombo and Grilli, 2005; Teece and Pisano, 1994). Another argument
towards a potential output premium of subsidized R&D over private R&D is the so-
called signaling effect whereby R&D subsidies act as a quality signal to potential in-
vestors and clients of the firm who could as a result be more likely to invest in the
project, increasing its chances of success (Lerner, 1999).
The outlined conceptual background thus suggests three main research questions
that can only be answered empirically:
1. Do subsidies stimulate additional private investment into R&D?
2. Does publicly funded R&D (and the possibly additionally induced private R&D)
lead to output additionality?
3. Is the output additionality of public R&D higher or lower than the one of pri-
vately financed R&D?2
2.2 Previous literature
The first quantitative evaluation of R&D policies has been carried out as early as
1957 by Blank and Stigler. After the US R&D budget was significantly raised dur-
ing the 1950s Blank and Stigler (1957) questioned the relationship between publicly
2Note that we focus in this paper solely on the effects subsidies may have on the beneficiary firm
itself. We do not investigate whether a potential increase in R&D spending generates positive spillover
effects to other members of society which is the standard justification for government intervention in
the market for R&D.
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funded and private R&D. Since then, the literature on quantitative evaluation be-
came vast, especially after the year 2000 when surveys about the state of the art were
published (see the surveys by David et al., 2000; Klette et al., 2000). The survey au-
thors critically reviewed the literature and identified methodological shortcomings in
existing studies. In particular, selection bias and endogeneity of subsidies in an R&D
investment equation had not been adequately modeled in many early empirical stud-
ies.3 Since then, the literature on the evaluation of innovation subsidies was revived
and many papers using modern micro-econometric techniques were published (see
Cerulli, 2010; Zúñiga Vicente et al., 2014 for surveys).
The main focus in literature has been on input additionality of subsidies, mainly
based upon a dichotomous subsidy variable (see e.g. Busom, 2000; Lach, 2002; Almus
and Czarnitzki, 2003; Duguet, 2004; Gonzales et al., 2005; Gonzales and Pazo, 2008;
Czarnitzki and Lopes Bento, 2012). Only a few papers focus on the effect of R&D sub-
sidies on R&D output. Czarnitzki and Hussinger (2004); Czarnitzki and Licht (2006);
Hussinger (2008); Czarnitzki and Delanote (2015) for example, use the estimated pri-
vate and treatment effect obtained from a matching estimator or other selection model
in an output equation in order to measure the effect of private and public R&D on
innovation output. These papers, however, applied more reduced-form-type mod-
els rather than incorporating R&D subsidy variables into a more structural approach
such as the CDM model, which is consequently the main contribution of this paper.
Thereby, we do not only add to the subsidy evaluation literature, but also to the struc-
tural models based upon the framework developed by Crépon et al. (1998).
3Firms receiving a subsidy might be different from companies that do not receive a subsidy: some
firms might be more likely to apply for public funding than others; some firms might consider the
administrative burden or the information sharing conditional upon being subsidized as reasons not
to apply. In addition, funding agencies typically follow a picking-the winner strategy, i.e. firms that
are highly innovative and conduct a lot of R&D might be more likely to get a subsidy. In other words,
subsidies become an endogenous variable in any equation on innovation-related activities.
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3 Extending the CDM model: assessing output addition-
ality of subsidies
The CDM model introduced by Crépon, Duguet and Mairesse in 1998 (Crépon et al.,
1998) is essentially a refinement of the knowledge production function framework
(Griliches, 1979). The original CDM model had three stages: (i) the firms’ choice to
engage in innovation activities or not, (ii) an R&D/innovation investment equation
(as measured by R&D intensity), and (iii) an innovation output stage and/or labor
productivity. In our application, we focus on the input and output additionality of
subsidies in the innovation process and therefore omit the first stage of the original
CDM model on the firms’ decision to engage in innovation.4 Consequently, the most
basic representation of both R&D input (R&D) and output (Output) stages could be
modeled as follows:
R&D = z′2ω+ ε2
↘
Output = β1R&D + z′1θ + ε1
where z1 and z2 refer to vectors of explanatory variables, β1,θ and ω are the coef-
ficient vectors to be estimated and ε1 and ε2 denote the error terms.
Starting from the last equation, the output stage, R&D captures the full amount
invested in R&D, i.e. both subsidies and privately financed R&D. In this context, how-
ever, we are interested in the effect of the components of this full R&D input, publicly
induced R&D and the purely private R&D.
In order to estimate the output additionality of subsidies, the current literature is
dominated by ad–hoc approaches instead of a more structural approach as suggested
in this paper. Before turning to the structural approach using the CDM framework,
4The empirical study will be limited to firms that engaged in innovation activities.
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we briefly discuss ad-hoc approaches which help to motivate our model.
• Approach 1: Dummy variable approach
One intuitive starting point for estimating output additionality is a dummy
variable approach, where an (innovation) output measure is simply regressed
on R&D input and a dummy variable, DSUB indicating wether a firm received
a subsidy, as well as the interaction of the subsidy dummy and R&D inputs.
Output = β1R&D + β2DSUB + β3DSUB× R&D + z′1θ + ε1 (1)
This approach is sometimes considered as allowing to conclude that a premium
(discount) is present if β3 would turn out to be positive (negative), that is, the
subsidy would affect the marginal productivity of R&D upwards (downwards).
However, the dummy variable approach neglects that subsidies are not constant
across firms, and also that R&D is itself a function of the subsidy. As subsidies
are usually varying in terms of the absolute monetary amount granted, this ap-
proach can in fact not allow to conclude whether subsidized R&D is more or
less productive then privately financed projects.
• Approach 2: Separate R&D input from subsidized amount
Another intuition for estimating output additionality could be to subtract the
subsidies from the R&D input and to estimate two separate coefficients.
Output = β1(R&D− SUB) + β2SUB + z′1θ + ε1 (2)
where R&D denotes the amount of R&D input and SUB the amount of subsidies
received. This specification would, on first sight, allow to conclude whether any
output additionality is present, that is, if β2 is larger than zero, and, moreover, if
the subsidized R&D is more productive than the purely privately financed one
if β2 > β1, and vice versa. However, this approach still neglects that even the
term (R&D − SUB) is a function of the subsidy, as the whole literature about
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treatment effects revolves around the question to what extent additional private
investment is stimulated by granting subsidies, especially as subsidies are typi-
cally distributed as ‘matching grants’, that is, the government pays only a share
of the total cost of a project.5
As R&D− SUB may not correspond to the R&D investment which is not subsidy–
induced, because the subsidy is expected to trigger also a higher private investment,
the estimation equation has to be modified further in order to account for the existing
treatment effects debate. Therefore we suggest to estimate following output equation
Output = β1(R&D− αSUB) + β2αSUB + z′1θ + ε1 (3)
where αSUB corresponds to a firm-specific treatment effect, i.e. the amount re-
ceived by the funding agency ánd the potential additional spending due to this sub-
sidy. The α is estimated in a previous equation by specifying that
R&D = αSUB + z′2ω+ ε2. (4)
In order to account for the literature on treatment effects estimation, it has to be
taken into account that SUB may itself be an endogenous regressor in the R&D input
equation and therefore, one would need to instrument this variable. Thus, the final
model is a recursive system of three equations, where the first equation could be
written as follows:
SUB = z′3δ+ ε3. (5)
Econometric implementation
If the error terms, ε1, ε2 and ε3 were not correlated with each other, this recursive sys-
tem of equations could be estimated sequentially by independent OLS regressions.
As this is unlikely to hold, though, consistent estimation requires an instrumental
5We show regression results of these not fully correct approaches in the appendix in Table A.3.
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variable approach, i.e. it is required that z1 6= z2 6= z3 or in other words, z3 must con-
tain instruments that are not in z2 and both z3 and z2 must contain instruments that
are not part of z1 for model identification.
This system of equations could be estimated using limited information estimators,
such as 2SLS, where each equation is estimated separately using the appropriate in-
struments. Because of the recursive nature of the system, we opt here for the so-called
control function approach. We estimate the first equation by OLS and obtain εˆ3. This
is then used to estimate the 2nd equation including the first stage residuals with OLS:
R&D = αSUB + z′2ω+ ρ1εˆ3 + ε2 (6)
In order to estimate the 3rd equation consistently, we have to plug in the residuals
of both preceding stages:
Output = β1(R&D− αSUB) + β2αSUB + z′1θ + ρ3εˆ3 + ρ2εˆ2 + ε1 (7)
In order to test whether subsidies generate an output premium over privately fi-
nanced R&D, we present the premium/discount component itself in line with Griliches
(1986).6 Following this, β2 can be set equal to a premium/discount component, let’s
say (1 + γ2) in which γ2 represents the actual amount of the premium/discount,
times the slope of the private R&D, (R&D− αSUB), β1. In other words, β2 then equals
(1+ γ2)× β1. In line with this, we rewrite the output equation:
Output = β1 [(R&D− αSUB) + (1+ γ2)αSUB] + z′1θ + ρ3εˆ3 + ρ2εˆ2 + ε1 (8)
As the regressor (R&D− αSUB) cannot be observed directly, we first have to es-
timate a reduced form of the equation, and back out the structural parameters after
6In a (knowledge) production function, Griliches allowed to look at the effect of different compo-
nents of R&D by weighting one of the terms (say R&D2) differently than the other, labeled as R&D1 in
this example. The full R&D term can then be decomposed as follows: R&D∗ = R&D1 + (1+ δ)R&D2,
where δ corresponds to an output premium or discount of this second R&D term.
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estimation. We therefore rearrange this equation as follows:
Output = β1R&D + γ2β1αSUB + z′1θ + ρ3εˆ3 + ρ2εˆ2 + ε1 (9)
= β1R&D + piSUB + z′1θ + ρ3εˆ3 + ρ2εˆ2 + ε1 (10)
where pi = γ2β1α. The γ2 can then straightforwardly be backed out as follows:
pi
β1α
. Testing whether there is a premium (discount) amounts to testing whether γ2 is
larger (smaller) than zero. The coefficient β2 itself, pointing to any output additional-
ity equals (1+ γ2)× β1 = β1 + piα .
Since the model estimated by means of the control function approach will produce
biased standard errors and as the coefficient α is only identified in the 2nd equation
where R&D inputs are a function of the subsidies, the standard errors in the sequence
of innovation input and output equations will be computed via bootstrapping, based
upon 200 bootstrap replications.
4 Data, variables and descriptive statistics
4.1 Data sources
The data used in this paper combine firm-level data with detailed subsidy data. The
firm-level data consists of the Flemish Community Innovation Survey (CIS) provided
by the Centre for R&D Monitoring (ECOOM) from KU Leuven and additional firm-
level data obtained from the Belfirst database published by Bureau van Dijk. The CIS
is a survey that is largely harmonized across the different European member states
in order to get a coherent view on innovation inputs and outputs. Next to informa-
tion on the innovative activity of the companies, the CIS data also provide general
information on the companies, such as sales, number of employees, founding year
and so forth. The CIS data over the years 2004-2010 were complemented with the
Belfirst database which basically contains accounting data for the population of Bel-
gian firms.
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These firm-level data were merged with detailed subsidy information obtained
from the agency ’Innovatie door Wetenschap en Technologie’ (IWT).7 These data con-
tain detailed information on subsidy grants for the population of Flemish firms. For
all firms, we know whether they applied for R&D grants, the grant decision, the
amount of subsidies granted and the duration of the funded projects.
The sample used in the regressions is thus a random sample of firms included
in the CIS data which were supplemented with accounting and subsidy data. The
CIS data allows to identify firms that innovated or attempted to innovate, i.e. they
introduced at least one product or process innovation or have ongoing innovation ac-
tivities or had started innovation projects but abandoned them. We restrict the sample
to possible innovators as firms that never even attempted to innovate are irrelevant
for the estimation of the efficacy and efficiency of R&D subsidies. After dropping ob-
servations with missing values or outliers in relevant variables, we end up with an
unbalanced panel of 2,472 observations corresponding to 1,521 different firms.
4.2 Variables
The dependent variables in this study are measures of innovation output, input and
subsidies. Innovation output is examined based upon a variable reflecting the per-
centage of sales due to new products; TURNNEW = sales due to new productstotal sales × 100.
As common in the literature, innovation input is measured as R&D intensity. On
the one hand, one can focus solely on internal R&D expenditures as it is mostly done
in the existing literature. On the other hand, one can look at total R&D expenditures
of firms, including both internal and external R&D. While the main focus of input
additionality studies is on private R&D expenditures, the measure of total R&D ex-
penditures is also included in this analysis as subsidy recipients may also contract-out
7The IWT administers the R&D subsidy schemes in Flanders. The scope of its existing funding
programs is quite broad as it supports a wide range of activities of small as well as large companies,
universities, third level education institutions and other Flemish innovative organizations, individu-
ally or collectively. More ample background information on the agency and its activities can be found
on the website of the agency, www.iwt.be, as well as in Larosse (2004).
11
some of their R&D activities. Consequently, we use two alternative measures in the
empirical analysis, RDint and RDtot which are calculated as R&D expenditurestotal sales × 100,
where R&D expenditures refers either to internal R&D, RDint, or total R&D, RDtot.
Subsidies are the final dependent variable in our model. As we have detailed in-
formation on the starting period of the subsidization, the end period and the total
amount granted, we can calculate the amount of subsidies received per year, IWT-
SUB.8 Based upon this variable, subsidy intensity is calculated, relative to sales of the
firm: IWTSUBINT = IWTSUBtotal sales × 100.
As outlined above in the methodology section, we need candidates for instrumen-
tal variables for both the subsidy and R&D input equations. In order to account for the
possible endogeneity of subsidies, several relevant variables are used. One of these
is the stock of past project applications a firm has filed (APPSTOCK). This variable
is constructed using the perpetual inventory method applying a 15% rate of obso-
lescence.9 This variable accounts for the firm’s experience with the Flemish subsidy
system. In general, a firm that has applied before for a subsidy might be more likely
to apply again because the firm is acquainted with the application procedure. As a
consequence, its chances of getting a subsidy are in general higher than for a firm not
having a history of applying. As this variable may be correlated with firm size and
we will separately control for size, we use APPSTOCK divided by employment in the
regression analysis.
In the same vein, SRATE_FIRM reflects the stock of success rates of previous ap-
plications (also using a 15% rate of obsolescence). This variable reflects to what extent
a firm had a successful interaction with the granting agency.
SRATE_OTHER is a similar variable to SRATE_FIRM but captures the previous
success of application of all other firms within the same industry, region and size
8The yearly amount of subsidies is calculated based upon a monthly redistribution of the total
subsidy grant. E.g. if a firm starts a subsidized project in April 2012 that ends in December 2013, 9/21
of the total amount will be allotted to 2012 and 12/21 to 2013.
9The perpetual inventory method calculates the stock of a specific variable (VARt) in time t, let’s
name this STOCKt as follows: STOCKt = (1− δ)× STOCKt−1 + VARt, where δ refers to the applied
discount rate or rate of obsolescence.
12
group, the latter being defined by whether a firm can be categorized as an SME or
not. This variable is supposed to capture the effect competitors might have on the
application process of a firm. At the same time, this variable reflects to what extent
the firm’s main competitors are likely to get funding. The presented variables are all
supposed to determine the subsidy variable IWTSUBINT but should not depend the
firm’s investment decision or innovation outcome.
As instrumental variables in the R&D equation, we first use a variable related to
the financial situation of the firm. We use the firms’ firm’s debt ratio (DEBT) (rela-
tive to capital and reserves) as a high debt ratio may limit the firms’ opportunities to
invest into R&D, but it should have no direct impact on the product market success
on the innovations. In addition, we add a long-term lag of the firms’ patent stocks
(PSold), i.e. the stock of applications that are at least five years old. We also use its
squared value (PSold2) to allow non-linearities. This old patent stock reflects the long
term history of innovation activities. This past involvement in innovation is likely to
strongly influence both the probability to receive subsidies and R&D expenditures.
However, the old patents may be mostly obsolete for current product sales10. In line
with this view, it has already often been argued that a large fraction of patents are
”worthless” or become it in a short period of time (Griliches, 1998). Newer patents,
however, can be expected to have a positive effect on innovation sales as they sup-
posedly prevent others from imitating the product. Therefore, we insert PSnew and
its square (PSnew2) in all equations. The patent stock variables are constructed based
upon the PATSTAT database, scaled by employment and constructed using the per-
petual inventory method applying a 15% rate of obsolescence of knowledge.
Other explanatory variables are included in all equations. A first set of variables
controls for firm size and age having an impact on innovation input and output. Firm
size is measured by the log of employment (lnEMP). Similarly, in order to control
for the firm’s age, the logarithm of this variable is included the estimations (lnAGE).
10Admittedly, the pharmaceutical industry may be an exception, as a single patent may correspond
almost to a product and development phases of drugs after patent filings may be long. However, for
most industries patents more than five years old may be almost obsolete
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The GP dummy indicates whether a firm is part of a group. Group firms might be
different from independent firms in their innovation input and innovation output as
they are integrated in a broader group of firms. Network effects might thus lead to
higher R&D investments and output. At the same time however, this might depend
on the integration of the firm in the group and its flexibility. When it comes to sub-
sidies, group members might be less likely to receive subsidies as independent firms
are advantaged in some policy programs (i.e. SME funding programs). On the other
hand, their probability of applying might be higher due to network effects, which
might positively impact the probability of receiving subsidies. Group members with
foreign headquarters should be considered independently of national groups due to
their presence on foreign territory, therefore a dummy FOREIGN is included (for a
discussion on multinationals and innovation see e.g. Castellani and Zanfei, 2006). In
addition, the dummy EXPORT, reflecting whether a firm is exporting, is included in
order to capture international presence, which might be positively related to inno-
vation activities of any kind as exporters are exposed to more intense competition
than other firms. Finally a set of province dummies captures location effects, indus-
try dummies account for other non-observed differences among industries and time
dummies capture business cycle effects.11
Note that all time-varying variables enter the regression as lagged values to avoid
simultaneity bias.
4.3 Descriptive statistics
Table 1 shows some descriptive statistics for the firms included in this study, split by
whether a firm received a subsidy or not.12
Column 3 presents the significance levels of two-sided t-tests on differences be-
tween mean values of the variables of subsidized and unsubsidized firms. Subsidized
firms are, on average, larger, more likely to be exporters and part of a group. They are
11An overview of the industry structure is given in table A.1 in appendix.
12The IWTSUBINT variable is thus 0 for all unsubsidized firms by construction.
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
(1) (2) (3)
Unsubsidized firms (n = 2154) Subsidized firms (n = 318) t-test, H0:mean (1) =
Variable Mean Std.Dev. Min Max Mean Std.Dev. Min Max mean (2)
DEBT 3.537 5.533 0 67.690 3.116 5.280 0 67.970
EMP 136.997 285.310 1 5820 383.261 808.290 1 5116 ***
PSnew 0.002 0.018 0 0.586 0.012 0.048 0 0.600 ***
PSold 0.002 0.015 0 0.320 0.012 0.037 0 0.400 ***
EXPORT 0.754 0.431 0 1 0.912 0.284 0 1 ***
GP 0.573 0.495 0 1 0.642 0.480 0 1 **
FOREIGN 0.308 0.462 0 1 0.267 0.443 0 1
AGE 27.788 20.451 1 225 27.420 23.588 2 147
APPSTOCK 0.007 0.049 0 1.445 0.044 0.094 0 0.680 ***
SRATE_OTHER 0.561 0.443 0 1 0.687 0.392 0 1 ***
SRATE_FIRM 0.002 0.053 0 1.85 0.255 0.574 0 1.85 ***
IWTSUBINT 0 0 0 0 0.971 2.267 0.001 19.555 NA
RDint 1.080 3.876 0 50 5.162 8.760 0 49.862 ***
RDtot 1.239 4.188 0 50 5.960 9.818 0 49.862 ***
TURNNEW 8.146 18.941 0 100 18.108 24.136 0 100 ***
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
also more likely to have a history of innovation, reflected by a larger patent stock. In
line with expectations, the summary statistics also show that subsidized firms have a
larger stock of both past project applications and application success rates. On aver-
age, close competitors of subsidized firms are more likely to have higher application
success rates. With respect to the outcome variables, subsidized firms seem to have
higher R&D intensities as well as a larger innovation output.
5 Empirical implementation and results
5.1 Innovation inputs
In this section we focus on input additionality effects of subsidies on the innovation
input decisions of firms. Table 2 presents the impact of IWT subsidies as measured
by subsidy intensity on internal R&D intensity, RDint, in column 1 and total R&D
intensity, RDtot, in column 2. As the subsidy variable is possibly endogenous in this
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equation it has been instrumented as outlined above. The first stage of this IV regres-
sion is shown in Table A.2 in the appendix. All excluded instruments are positive and
significant in the first stage and the regression does not suffer from a possible weak
instrument bias, as the F-test on joint significance of the instrumental variables in the
first stage amounts to a value of 12.74.
We also find support for the common opinion that the subsidy variable is an en-
dogenous regressor in the R&D equation as the residuals of the first stage regression,
εˆ3 are significantly different from zero in the regression; at least at the 10% signifi-
cance level (see Table 2).13
The results of the R&D equation confirm a positive significant impact of the sub-
sidy intensity on innovation input both when this latter is measured as internal R&D
intensity and as total R&D intensity. Full crowding out can thus be rejected as subsi-
dies do seem to stimulate innovation expenditures.
In order to test whether partial crowding out can be rejected, the following logic
can be applied. If the subsidy rate would amount to 50% we should expect that the
estimated coefficient of the subsidy variable in the R&D equation amounts at least
to the value 2, because the firm would need to finance the same amount as the sub-
sidy itself from private resources if the project is implemented to full extent.14 More
generally, the estimated coefficient should be larger than the inverse of the subsidy
rate (1/SR). The average subsidy rate in our framework is 43.395%, implying that
total R&D investment should increase by at least 2.304 times the subsidies received.
The results presented in table 2 suggest that this is indeed the case: the estimated
coefficient is 3.046.15
13We also computed the Hansen J-test and did not reject the hypothesis that the instruments are ex-
ogenous, i.e. the instruments are not only relevant in the first stage but also valid in terms of statistical
requirements.
14Note that R&D spending in our case is all money invested, i.e. including the subsidy. If we would
have measured R&D net of the subsidy the relevant test in the example outlined above would be
whether the estimated coefficient is larger than the value 1.
15Strictly speaking we cannot reject the hypothesis of some crowding–out as a t-test reveals that the
estimated coefficient of 3.046 is not significantly larger than 2.304. However, this is not the main focus
of the paper and results suggest that the subsidy certainly increases private R&D investment by an
economically significant factor.
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Table 2: Innovation input equations
(1) (2)
RDint RDtot
IWTSUBINT 2.569*** 3.046***
(0.402) (0.593)
DEBT -0.038*** -0.038**
(0.012) (0.016)
lnEMP 0.198*** 0.238***
(0.073) (0.087)
PSnew 25.267** 28.960**
(10.950) (11.965)
PSnew2 -55.502*** -74.175***
(21.160) (23.633)
PSold 20.972* 34.118*
(11.726) (18.100)
PSold2 -95.165** -131.593**
(38.265) (54.596)
EXPORT 0.636*** 0.678***
(0.219) (0.236)
GP 0.329 0.394*
(0.206) (0.227)
FOREIGN -0.301 -0.226
(0.274) (0.309)
lnAGE -0.317*** -0.346***
(0.115) (0.131)
Constant 0.180 0.103
(0.484) (0.554)
N 2472 2472
εˆ3 -0.779* -1.156*
(0.460) (0.683)
Test on joint significance of
- Industry χ2(11) = 110.31*** χ2(11) = 111.64***
- Time χ2(2) = 1.94 χ2(2) = 1.59
- Region χ2(4) = 3.86 χ2(4) = 3.91
Test on joint significance of
DEBT, PSold, PSold2 17.79*** 12.94***
Standard errors in parentheses
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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The coefficients of the other control variables are, in general, in line with expecta-
tions. Patent stock, both old and new, seems to have a curvilinear effect on innovation
inputs. Larger firms seem to have a higher innovation input and in line with expecta-
tions on their international presence, exporters invest more into innovation activities.
In addition, the older the firm, the less it invests in innovation activities on average.
Group members seem to have a slightly higher total R&D intensity, ceteris paribus.
Finally, the test on the joint significance of DEBT and the old patent stocks show
that they may well serve as instrumental variables for the output equation as they
have a strong, joint influence on R&D investment (see Table 2).
5.2 Innovation outputs
This section assesses the impact of private R&D inputs on output and analyzes to
what extent a premium or discount can be found of the subsidized projects with re-
spect to innovation output at the firm level. Table 3 presents the results of this esti-
mation. The first column presents results when the calculation of the R&D variables
is based upon internal R&D intensity (RDint) and column 2 when this is based upon
total R&D intensity (RDtot).
Results show that the private part of both total R&D expenditures and internal
R&D expenditures has a positive significant effect on innovation output as reflected
by the coefficient of RDint and RDtot respectively. IWTSUBINT is not significant.
However, as described extensively introduced before, this coefficient should not be
interpreted, as it is the reduced form coefficientpi. Instead, in a first step, the structural
parameter, β2, referring to the coefficient of subsidy induced R&D, can be calculated
as introduced above: β2 = β1 + piα . Results in table 3 show that the subsidy induced
R&D investment has a positive significant effect on output.
Another question in this study is whether this lower coefficient of subsidized R&D
reflects a lower productivity when compared to the privately invested R&D. There-
fore, we could test whether β2 is significantly different from β1, or in the logic of the
Griliches approach on discounts or premia, we are interested in the structural param-
18
Table 3: Innovation output equations
Output Equation
(1) (2)
RDint 3.559**
(1.641)
RDtot 3.410**
(1.571)
IWTSUBINT -3.883 -5.212
(4.449) (4.566)
lnEMP 0.878 0.757
(0.593) (0.622)
PSnew -17.320 -39.239
(76.823) (78.217)
PSnew2 -11.087 59.380
(194.907) (230.117)
EXPORT 2.574* 2.506
(1.551) (1.588)
GP -1.526 -1.752
(1.200) (1.361)
FOREIGN -1.072 -1.315
(1.477) (1.521)
lnAGE -0.832 -0.798
(0.794) (0.873)
Constant 3.853 4.273
(3.363) (3.394)
N 2472 2472
Bootstrap replications 200
β2 2.048** 1.699**
(0.960) (0.772)
γ2 (=discount/premium) -0.425 -0.502
(1.992) (0.660)
εˆ3 -0.623 0.632
(2.521) (2.617)
εˆ2 -2.801* -2.765*
(1.638) (1.569)
Test on joint significance of
- Industry χ2(11) = 44.32*** χ2(11) = 45.50***
- Time χ2(2) = 3.08 χ2(2) = 2.92
- Region χ2(4) = 3.29 χ2(4) = 3.32
Standard errors in parentheses
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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eter (γ2 = piβ1α ).
For the output equation with R&D input measured as RDint, we find γ2 = ( −3.8833.559∗2.569) =
0.425, suggesting thus a discount of subsidized R&D regarding the marginal pro-
ductivity effect of 42.5% with respect to privately financed R&D when internal R&D
speding is used as regressor. Similarly, a discount of 50.2% is suggested with respect
to total R&D intensity (γ2 = ( −5.2123.410∗3.046)). However, as shown in table 3, these coeffi-
cients are insignificant, i.e. statistically we do not reject the hypothesis that privately
financed R&D and subsidized R&D have equal marginal productivity effects.
In sum, results point to a positive significant effect on innovation output of both
purely private and subsidy induced R&D. Furthermore, we do not find evidence of a
lower effect of this latter component compared to privately financed R&D in terms of
generated sales due to new products.
There is thus no conclusive evidence supporting either one of the arguments out-
lined above, in favor of expecting a discount or suggesting a premium of subsidy
induced R&D relative to private R&D in terms of innovative output.
6 Conclusion
This paper models input and output additionality in a structural model. It extends
the Crépon Duguet Mairesse (CDM) framework by incorporating subsidies as a de-
terminant of both the input and output equations. Thereby, this study adds to the
CDM framework, the widely spread input additionality literature and the less inves-
tigated output additionality strand of research. This is done by explicitly modeling
the interdependency between subsidies, innovation input and output.
The empirical study is carried out using Flemish Innovation Survey data coupled
with detailed subsidy data. In line with a lot of the prevalent literature, the empirical
analysis finds evidence for input additionality of subsidies. In general, crowding–out
can thus be rejected and public incentive schemes seem to increase R&D spending in
the business sector.
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In addition, this analysis reveals that, in general, an increase in private R&D inputs
leads to higher innovative performance. In addition, subsidy induced R&D, encom-
passing both the subsidy and the additional R&D investment due to this subsidy, also
increases sales due to new products. Furthermore, there is no evidence of a lower or
higher productivity of public R&D compared to private R&D. Statistically both com-
ponents of firms R&D activities have similar marginal effects on sales with new prod-
ucts. There is thus no evidence suggesting that policy makers either select projects
with lower private value or that subsidized projects fail much more frequently than
others.
Of course, our study has a number of caveats that remain for further research. A
specific shortcoming of this study is that the subsidy application and granting deci-
sion stages are not incorporated separately as in Takalo et al., 2013), for instance. As
in numerous other studies of this kind, it would be valuable to have access to more
balanced panel data that allow to control for unobserved firm-specific effects in the
regressions. In addition, future research could further extend this model to heteroge-
neous treatment effects in the input stage, i.e. the estimation of firm-specific αi, and
the output stage.
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Appendices
Table A.1: Industry structure
Industry Description ]OBS
1 Manufacture of food products, beverages and tobacco 245
2 Manufacture of textiles 109
3 Manufacture of wood and wood products; manufacture of
pulp, paper and paper products; publishing and printing;
105
4 Manufacture of coke, refined petroleum products and nu-
clear fuel; Manufacture of chemicals, chemical products
and man-made fibres; Manufacture of rubber and plastic
products
263
5 Manufacture of basic metals and fabricated metal products 231
6 Manufacture of machinery and equipment n.e.c.; Manu-
facture of transport equipment
311
7 Manufacture of electrical and optical equipment 127
8 Fishing; mining and quarrying; Mineral products; Furni-
ture; other industries; Waste collection, treatment and dis-
posal activities; materials recovery; Other services
254
9 Wholesale and retail trade; repair of motor vehicles and
motorcycles
320
10 Transportation, storage 175
11 Research & Development; other business services 182
12 ICT and related services 150
Total Number of Observations: 2,472
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Table A.2: First stage : Subsidy regression
(1)
IWTSUBINT
APPSTOCK 4.669**
(2.304)
SRATE_OTHER 0.105***
(0.033)
SRATE_FIRM 0.864***
(0.256)
DEBT 0.004
(0.003)
lnEMP -0.018
(0.015)
PSnew -0.566
(3.340)
PSnew2 13.893*
(8.426)
PSold -3.698
(4.130)
PSold2 23.002
(20.562)
EXPORT 0.044
(0.039)
GP -0.058
(0.037)
FOREIGN 0.073*
(0.039)
lnAGE -0.028
(0.019)
Constant 0.014
(0.082)
N 2472
Test on joint significance of
Industry χ2(11) = 45.12***
Time χ2(2) = 1.99
Region χ2(4) = 18.14***
Standard errors in parentheses
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Columns 1 and 4 of Table A.3 show an OLS regression of the output equation without
accounting for the endogeneity of the R&D input and without including the subsidy variable.
Columns 2 and 5 show OLS regressions where subsidies are included and the R&D variables
are interacted with the subsidies. Columns 3 and 6 present the regressions where R&D expen-
diture is calculated net of subsidies and subsidies are included as a separate regressor. All of
these equations are estimating the marginal effects of R&D and subsidies not correctly as we
argue in Section 3 of the paper.
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Table A.3: ’Naive’ OLS innovation output equations
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
RDint 0.841*** 0.985***
(0.128) (0.197)
RDintnosub 0.782***
(0.143)
RDtot 0.732*** 0.868***
(0.114) (0.179)
RDtotnosub 0.673***
(0.128)
IWTSUBINT 1.739 1.720
(1.077) (1.061)
DSUB 6.252*** 6.275***
(1.590) (1.591)
RDintDSUB -0.499**
(0.247)
RDtotDSUB -0.452**
(0.222)
lnEMP 1.299*** 1.105*** 1.345*** 1.293*** 1.103*** 1.344***
(0.388) (0.396) (0.389) (0.390) (0.397) (0.391)
PSnew 74.257* 57.176 73.662* 71.650* 56.034 71.303*
(41.736) (42.594) (41.587) (42.124) (42.881) (41.897)
PSnew2 -145.870** -108.381 -157.744** -136.385* -103.402 -150.224**
(73.335) (75.245) (73.093) (74.614) (76.141) (74.070)
EXPORT 4.608*** 4.300*** 4.564*** 4.634*** 4.325*** 4.585***
(0.858) (0.863) (0.857) (0.857) (0.862) (0.857)
GP -0.665 -0.708 -0.627 -0.685 -0.742 -0.641
(1.011) (1.011) (1.012) (1.012) (1.012) (1.012)
FOREIGN -1.885* -1.567 -1.919* -1.963* -1.640 -1.995*
(1.075) (1.080) (1.069) (1.076) (1.081) (1.070)
lnAGE -1.761*** -1.702*** -1.730*** -1.770*** -1.700*** -1.736***
(0.563) (0.564) (0.562) (0.566) (0.566) (0.565)
Constant 4.199* 4.612* 4.012 4.260* 4.612* 4.051
(2.537) (2.533) (2.547) (2.543) (2.535) (2.553)
N 2472 2472 2472 2472 2472 2472
Test on joint significance of
- Industry F(11) 4.74*** 4.53*** 4.75*** 4.78*** 4.56*** 4.80***
- Time F(2) 1.47 1.79 1.61 1.49 1.77 1.63
- Region F(4) 1.44 1.48 1.32 1.44 1.47 1.31
Standard errors in parentheses
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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